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CONCORDE INCIDENTS & FATAL ACCIDENTThe crash of Air France Flight 4590 was the first fatal accident involving the Concorde, which has been in service since 1976.
The supersonic aircraft, however, has been involved in several incidents in its 20-year-plus history, including a series of tire blowouts on takeoff that led to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) making operating procedure recommendations to French aviation authorities.
In a Nov. 9, 1981, letter to the French Bureau Enquetes Accidents (FBEA), the NTSB expressed its concern over the number of blown tire incidents experienced by Air France Concorde aircraft during a 20-month period.
From July 1979 to February 1981, Air France Concordes had been involved in four potentially catastrophic incidents as a result of blown tires on takeoff.
Crashed July 25, 2000 at 4:44 p.m. Paris time in Gonesse, France, near Paris Charles de Gaulle Airport, Air France Flight 4590 was the first fatal accident involving the Concorde, which has been in service since 1976. The aircraft was the 3rd production aircraft, built in Toulouse, France, tail number F-BTSC, it was carrying 100 passengers, 9 crew.
Accident Aircraft Tail Number:
F-BTSC
Manufacturer's No.
203 (third production aircraft)
First Flight:
Jan. 31, 1975
11,989 flight hours;
3,978 flight cyclesEngines:
4 x Rolls-Royce/Snecma
Olympus 593 Mk. 610 turbojetsThrust:
4 x 38,050 lbf. SLST including 17% increment from afterburner
Capacity:
100 passengers
Wingspan:
83.8 ft.
Length:
203.8 ft.
Wing area:
3,856 sq. ft.
Maximum take off weight:
408,000 lb. / 185,500 kg.
Empty weight:
173,500 lb. / 78,870 kg.
Max. zero fuel weight:
203,000 lb. / 92,280 kg.
Max. landing weight:
245,000 lb. / 111,370 kg.
Fuel capacity:
31,650 USG @ 6.7 lb./gal.
212,000 lb. / 96,370 kg / 115,600 litersWing loading @ MTOW:
105.8 psf.
Thrust/weight:
0.37
Max. cruise speed:
Mach 2.04 @ 51,300 ft.
Range, max. fuel:
3,550 naut. mi. / 6575 km.
Ceiling:
60,000 ft. / 20,000 m.
SL Rate of Climb:
5,000 fpm.
Takeoff to 35 ft.:
11,200 ft. / 3,734 m.
Takeoff speeds @ MTOW:
V1 decision speed 165 kt. / 305 kmh.
VR rotation speed 195 kt. / 360 kmh.
V2 climbout speed 220 kt. / 407 kmh.Speed for min. drag:
@ 408,000 lb. MTOW 400 kt.
@ 245,000 lb. MLW 310 kt.For comparison, a twin-engine Boeing 767-300ER has a similar maximum take off weight (MTOW) of 407,000 lb. but a total thrust of just 120,000 lbf., for a T/W of 0.29 and a wing loading of 133 psf.
On Aug. 24, 1999, BA's Concorde Flight BAW2 departed from Runway 22L at JFK. At the same time, its Concorde Flight BAW1 was inbound, intercepting the localizer to Runway 4R. The aircraft passed within 800 ft. vertically and 0.7 mi. horizontally of each other.
NTSB preliminary reports describe two recent incidents involving Concordes:
On Oct. 8, 1998, at 0900 EST, Concorde 102, U.K. registration G-BOAC, operated by British Airways as Flight 001, experienced a partial separation of the lower rudder while in cruise flight over the North Atlantic, near Newfoundland. The flight departed London Heathrow airport and was operating under instrument flight rules in international airspace at the time of the incident. The aircraft was cruising at Flight Level 547 or 54,700 ft. at Mach 2. According to the report, the flight crew felt a "thump" in the airframe followed by a buzz. The flight continued on to JFK, and landed without incident. There were no injuries among the three flight crew members, six attendants or 62 passengers. Post flight inspection revealed that 40% of the lower rudder was missing, the separation occurring aft of the rudder pivot point.Then, in February 1981, aircraft F-BTSD, which was en route from Mexico City to Paris with a stop at Washington, blew its tires on takeoff from Dulles. The crew disregarded the previous technical information update, said the NTSB's letter, and raised the landing gear. The damage caused engine problems that forced the crew to land at JFK. Preliminary investigation data indicated the passengers were not prepared for a possible emergency landing or evacuation. In addition, the aircraft's cockpit voice recorder (CVR) was inoperative and had been so for several flights.
The NTSB expressed its concern with crew noncompliance of previously adopted procedures, particularly in raising the landing gear. The safety board letter said the consequences of such action (including hydraulic failure, fire or explosion) could be catastrophic.
The Nov. 9, 1981, letter concludes with the NTSB urging the FBEA to take the following actions:
Incorporate a takeoff procedure for suspected or known tire failure into the Emergency Section of Air France's Concorde Airplane Flight Manual that would include the "mandatory requirement to leave landing gear extended, to return to the takeoff airfield, to advise cabin attendants of intended action and to brief passengers for a precautionary landing."Direct the development and adoption by Air France of training that stresses flight/cabin crew coordination prior to precautionary or abnormal landings.
Develop a procedure to positively check the recording capability of the CVR prior to flight.
According to a statement recently released by the safety board, these procedures were implemented and the November 1981 recommendation closed.
In October 1979, aircraft F-BVFD's No. 7 and 8 tires failed on takeoff out of New York JFK International Airport. Despite the previous recommendation, according to the NTSB, the gear was retracted and the flight continued on to Paris.
A similar incident occurred on July 21, 1979, during a takeoff from Dulles.
The NTSB letter states that, following these two events, corrective action was voluntarily taken by appropriate authorities. The French director general of civil aviation issued an air worthiness directive and Air France issued a Technical Information Update, each calling for revised procedures. These included required inspection of each wheel/tire for condition, pressure and temperature prior to each takeoff. In addition, crews were advised that landing gear should not be raised when a wheel/tire problem is suspected.
While all parties were in agreement as to the validity of the corrective actions, the effectiveness of the actions was put in doubt, said the NTSB, by two more incidents that followed.
The first incident occurred on June 14, 1979, when an aircraft experienced blowouts of No. 5 and 6 tires on the left main landing gear on takeoff from Washington Dulles International Airport. Tire debris and wheel shrapnel resulted in "damage to the No. 2 engine, puncture of three fuel tanks and severance of several hydraulic lines and electrical wires," the letter said. A large hole was torn in the top wing skin which covers the wheel well area (AW&ST June 25, 1979, p. 26).
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